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609 578 [558] not shown the right attitude of a man under obligation. This, in a sense, is true. For neither side can admit to obligation without losing prestige; and both must attempt to claim the superordinate position in a creditor-debtor relationship.

612 But a man does not feel any embarrassment in asking for help from a kinsman. In these circumstances there is no shame in being under obligation or a debt of gratitude. Irrespective of the state of the balance of favours and counter favours, collateral relatives of the same generation, by reason of their kinship, are conceptually equal since they are descended from a pair of siblings who, before marriage and apart from the chances of [554] age and sex, were socially equivalent persons. A man does not lose prestige through obligation to a kinsman; on the contrary his reputation is increased, for the community pays attention to a person whose kinsmen lend him immediate and effective support. And for the man who gives aid to his kin, the knowledge that men learn of his actions through the gratitude of the kinsman who receives it, is sufficient recompense. For in this way he wins a reputation as a man of honour 'who supports his kinsmen'. If through wealth or influence a man is in a position to act as a general protector of his kindred, not only is he expected to do so, but this, in most cases, is also his wish. There is some altruism here. A man takes pleasure in the company of his kinsman; he finds him on occasion a source of practical advantage, but in particular he holds to him and has confidence in him simply because he is a kinsman. And for these reasons complaints of ingratitude against kinsmen are relatively few.

612 627 But although a man is under a moral obligation to help a collateral relative, this assistance is not given unconditionally. The important consideration is that it must not conflict with the interests of the family. This emerges very clearly in situations of physical violence. A man is not expected to accept responsibility for avenging the death of a collateral kinsman. He will give moral support to the family of the victim but he is unlikely to go [682] farther than that. A vengeance killing leads to the arrest of the killer and a prison sentence, which is sometimes followed by self-imposed exile in another district of Greece when there is any fear of counter vengeance. In this way a shepherd's family might lose its protector at least for some years, perhaps for ever. Only in unusual circumstances where a man feels that his

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μᾶς ζοῦν). Every member of the family has a right to draw on this common stock according to the needs of his status and situation. From it are drawn the dowries of the daughters, which sometimes exceed in value the patrimony of a brother. It is the family flock which must support the expenses of a son's higher education, or the cost of medical treatment in emergencies.

As we have observed in chapter four, no partition of the family property ought to occur before all the daughters have been married with dowries which represent their share of the commonwealth. Thereafter each son has a right to one share in the flock and any other property which the family may own. One further share is reserved for the support of the two parents if they are still alive when the joint property is divided, and this property passes with them into the family of the youngest son in which by custom they spend the last days of their life. If only one parent is alive at the time of partition, only a half share is retained for his or her support. When the old people eventually die, their sheep remain with the flock of the youngest son. This is not regarded as a form of ultimogeniture any more than the succession of the eldest brother to the office of family head is considered to be primogeniture. The additional wealth which passes to the youngest brother is thought to be only a just compensation for the support of the aged parents which, although it is a sacred duty, is also in their declining years of mental and physical feebleness a considerable burden. The right of a son to a share in the flock of the corporate family may be implemented at any time after he reaches adult age, which today is judged to be his twenty-second or twenty-third year, on his return from military service. In practice, he will not claim this share until he is married and the father of children, yet if he should quarrel with his father or brothers and decide to leave the family before this time, or if he is driven out, he is entitled to his share of the family wealth. Normally, however bitter the quarrel, a son may not be disinherited. A father may drive his son out of the house but not out of his inheritance; unless he is guilty of some ultimate crime such as incest or fratricide.

We can see from these facts that in principle the father and his sons, by virtue of their common membership in the

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596 577 627 person of his violator. On the other hand, the family of the original killer do not have to suffer the consequences of passive solidarity; a brother, father, or son of the killer is not generally an object of vengeance. But despite the absence of passive solidarity in vengeance killing, the ideal course of a vendetta is still visualized as terminating in the mutual extinction of the two families. As we shall see, this is most unlikely to occur in practice. It is generally to a brother or son, more especially the former, that the duty of vengeance killing for murder falls. A father is seldom involved, for women and children are inviolate, and only in the case of the killing of an only son without issue will he be left as the one possible avenger. Normally, an unmarried brother avenges a brother, a son his father, when the latter has no unmarried brother.

During the period 1945–55 it seems that only two successful killings have occurred amongst the Sarakatsani that were specifically vengeance for a previous murder, although for the same period I have details of varying completeness concerning seven other killings for various causes (other than the hostilities of the 1947–9 civil war). One reason for the low incidence of vengeance killing is that the killer is generally removed or removes himself from the scene of action immediately after the event. Today, the Greek police are well organized and omni- [578] present. Generally, killings occur either as the result of boundary disputes or questions of honour, so that the identity of a [682] killer is widely known. He is quickly arrested and finds asylum in prison. When he is released from prison some five to ten years later, his kinsmen will advise him whether the victim has a brother or son able to revenge him, and depending on the nature of this advice the killer will either return to the community or move to another district of the Epirus or to Thessaly. Therefore, in most cases, the absence of passive solidarity in blood vengeance and the removal of the killer to prison and later to voluntary exile prevents the execution of vengeance. Exile is clearly not so honourable an outcome as a vengeance killing for the victim's family, but it strikes some kind of rough balance between the two groups. It relieves the avenger of the need to spend a number of years in prison, followed possibly by exile. The killer himself is believed to suffer considerably in his exile, distant from the support of his family and kinsmen. And it is the

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of patronage that links each family individually to the wider structure of Greek society.

But, clearly, there is a limit to the amount of openly expressed hostility that this community is able to tolerate. Shepherds and their sheep are vulnerable, and in practice prudence discourages the free expression of hostility. The reciprocal trespass practised by shepherds who share a common grazing boundary is generally confined to areas from which there is a secure line of retreat; and in grazing disputes shepherds are careful to fight with weapons which may cause unpleasant wounds but are unlikely to kill. Wanton murders are discouraged through the removal of the killer by imprisonment, voluntary exile, or vengeance. By whatever agency this may occur, the family is too small a group to afford the loss of a man, and only an imperative obligation of honour justifies such a risk.

But this relatively limited display of active hostility is not in balance with the unequivocal character of the oppositions between families unrelated by kinship or marriage. These find a more extended and satisfactory expression in competitive behaviour and values which have been mentioned so frequently. The sociological importance of competition[1] is precisely that it represents a kind of opposition which is often indirect. In this instance protagonists compete for social prestige, that is for something which in material form none of them possesses. Where the prize has this intangible quality, direct attack may be irrelevant. Indeed, since social prestige requires the favourable response of the community to a man's qualities and actions after these have been evaluated in terms of the accepted system of values, it depends overwhelmingly on the opinions of enemies. To oppose successfully other unrelated families in terms of prestige, men must compete to the limit in their adherence to these values. They do this without causing one another obvious material harm; and the more they oppose one another in this way, the more they affirm their support of a particular system of values and beliefs. In this context competition for social prestige, while it clearly encourages that family particularism of which it is itself a symptom, nevertheless gives to this competitive complex a certain unity and coherence through a common system of values. These are, as it were, the rules of the game.

[1] Georg Simmel, *Conflict*, translated by Wolff, Glencoe, Illinois, 1955, p. 57.

/216 cont./

627 decided upon and carried out by individuals. They are variants of the
626 major sanction, namely social isolation, the nature and importance of
689 which we have pointed out. With respect to the removal of the head, we have nothing to say since the facts speak for themselves.

After this general survey we may conclude:

629 First, that it is certain that arbiters, groups and individuals
692 determined by circumstances or by a regulation, actually perform the
182 legal functions set forth at the beginning. They enforce and demand
626 respect for the order dictated by the customs and general ideas of their society. The first two /arbiters and groups/ do so by relying on the group and its dynamics; the individuals close /by means of/ their own specific functions recognized by the group and supported by it when they fulfill them.

Second, that the rules of organization and functioning of Sarakatsani groups, stated above, their customs as well as what we have called "their general social ideas" take the place of rules or prescriptions of law. For, depending on the cases and the circumstances, conformity to them is required. And they are followed as a result of the mechanism of "sanction-coercion," either visible or disguised.

Sarakatsani society therefore has law and agencies of law. Though they are not always apparent, they nonetheless exist.

CRIME AND MISDEMEANORS AMONG THE SARAKATSANI.

693 The Sarakatsani consider a certain number of acts as crimes or
694 misdemeanors. We propose in this section to describe them, as well as
(128) to indicate the punishments associated with them and the means of which they are carried out.

Homicide and assault.

682 Respect for life and for the integrity of the body is a rule the violation of which leads to the death of the culprit.

/217/ This rule must not be considered identical with that of the penal code. A look at the situations in which it is applied will suffice

/217 cont./

682 to show the difference between them.

Thus, one who kills or wounds an opponent in the course of an open fight on equal terms (the Sarakatsani say "as is suitable for courageous men") is not prosecuted. However, if the victim is killed or wounded in an unexpected attack, the murderer is exposed to blood vengeance. "the blood of the dead one must be paid with blood," the Sarakatsani say.

682 627 628

It seems that if homicide in an open struggle is not punished it is because the victim has had the means to defend himself--a conception similar to the one which justifies the duel.

As for blood vengeance, its justification resides in definite social realities arising from family structure and the social life of the Sarakatsani in general.

Vengeance demands that the murderer be killed by the kinsmen of his victim. Yet the matter is not considered closed by the punishment of the guilty one. For the kinsmen of the latter must retaliate with other murders. Thus a vicious circle, that of the "vendetta," which may go on for years with many deaths on both sides is entered. It really seems that while the Sarakatsani proclaim respect for life, they forget this rule when faced with homicide, and thereupon act in a contrary manner. This is an apparently contradictory situation which may lead one to question the actual existence of this rule.

In order to understand this phenomenon it is suitable to cite two very significant cases of vendetta:

627 628 613 [581]

--Before the last world war a vendetta between two important lineages from Tchépélovo in Epirus, the Tzoumanis and the Koumbis, lasted several years and claimed eleven victims. In view of this situation which seemed insoluable, the head, M. Tzoumanis, had the sagacity to arrange a marriage between one of his nieces and a Koumbis son. The vendetta ended forthwith.

682 627

--A young man from the region of Pélasghia (Stérea Hellas) recently

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682 627 killed another from there; he was arrested and condemned by the assizes of Lamia to 12 years in prison. Everybody now knows that at the end of his sentence he will be killed by the kinsmen of his victim.

[628] [602] It is appropriate to recall here the rule according to which the vendetta is not practiced when the victim and the murderer are kinsmen.

682 627 628 182 /218/ Combining these facts, we may conclude that the vendetta is not viewed merely or strictly speaking as punishment of a crime. Otherwise the kinsmen of the victim cited in our second example would not be ready to kill the culprit who had already been condemned by the law. Moreover, once the culprit is executed, and justice has therefore been done, there would be no reason for retaliation by his kinsmen. It is thus obvious that the vendetta has another purpose. It is that of re-establishing the social equilibrium, temporarily upset by the murder.

602 682 627 628 182 In the course of our study of the functions of kinship we pointed out that the "others," the non-relatives, represent virtual enemies, that therefore the family must seek at all costs to strengthen itself by enlarging the circle of kinship. By depriving it of one of its members, the murderer diminishes the family of the victim, whereas that of the culprit becomes stronger. This implies that until the moment of the crime the respective family groups are considered equal, which is no longer the case after the crime. The family of the victim must then seek to neutralize the dangerous excess number of the opposing family by diminishing it in proportion. But then the latter in turn regards itself in a bad situation. And vengeance begins all over again.

602 682 627 581 182 These assertions are corroborated by the way in which the vendetta mentioned in our first example was terminated. The Tzoumanis family gave one of its members to the Koumbis family. This exchange of individuals, by means of marriage, reestablished the equilibrium, this time positively. They /these assertions/ are likewise corroborated by the prohibition of vengeance between relatives. The family, already weakened by a homicide, must not be further weakened by new murders. (33)

/218 cont./

33. The same idea is to be found in antiquity: G. Glotz: La solidarité, p. 47-48.

Thus, there is no contradiction between the vendetta and the prohibition of homicide. If the execution of the murderer is avenged in turn that is because another principle comes into play, that of safeguarding at all costs the moral and social integrity of the family. The necessity to abide by this principle is so over whelming that the prohibition of homicide yields to it in the end.

It is true that this arrangement is not the most fortunate. However, it reflects very well the relations between the individual and /219/ the group, or rather the individual and the family, the choice in the final analysis being in favor of the group.

Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the vendetta presupposes a collective responsibility of the family groups in case of homicide: first, because they usually seek to kill the murderer himself; second, if they kill instead one of his close relatives, which is not unusual, this is not because they consider him co-responsible, but in order to weaken the family. That is why, furthermore they then choose the best, the most distinguished, the strongest.

As to the application of the vendetta, there is no procedure provided to judge the affair and to pronounce a verdict. Custom, known beforehand by all, is followed.

Carrying out the vendetta is the responsibility chiefly of the young men of the family. The women are excluded from it both as victims and executors.

Sentimental and sexual relations outside marriage.

Sarakatsani society disapproves strongly of sentimental and sexual relations outside marriage.

A statement based on Sarakatsani ideology is very indicative in this respect. According to it, cases of this kind never occur among them, as